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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 16-2310 
___________ 
 
BRIAN JOSEPH LYSZKOWSKI, 
   Appellant 
v. 
 
DIANE E. GIBBONS; LISA ANNE SILVESTRI; KAREN R. BRAMBLETT 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-15-cv-02210) 
District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
December 9, 2016 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., GREENBERG and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Opinion filed: April 13, 2017) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Pro se appellant Brian Lyszkowksi appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss his Second Amended Complaint filed under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  We will affirm. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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I. 
 Lyszkowksi initiated this action in 2015 against Bucks County, Pennsylvania, 
Common Pleas Judge Diane Gibbons, Bucks County Probation Officer Lisa Silvestri, and 
Karen Bramblett, a then-Pennsylvania Superior Court Prothonotary.  The gravamen of 
Lyszkowksi’s complaint is that Gibbons and Silvestri denied him due process of law at 
his 2013 probation violation hearing – where Judge Gibbons revoked his probation and 
sentenced him to a term of confinement – and that Bramblett improperly docketed his 
notice of appeal from that judgment, thwarting his appeal to the Superior Court.   
 In 2012, Lyszkowksi was placed on 18 months’ probation in Bucks County after 
he pleaded guilty to several drug offenses.  On April 5, 2013, Judge Gibbons ordered a 
probation violation hearing for May 1, 2013, on a praecipe filed by Silvestri alleging that 
Lyszkowksi violated his probation in numerous respects.1  In response, on April 26, 
2013, Lyszkowksi filed a “Motion to Strike Adult Probation and Parole Department 
Document for Material Falsehoods,” challenging the factual basis for the alleged 
violations.  At the May 1, 2013, hearing, Judge Gibbons denied Lyszkowksi’s motion to 
strike, revoked his probation, and sentenced him to a term of confinement of six to 12 
months.  On May 10, 2013, Lyszkowksi filed a “Motion to Modify and Reconsider 
                                              
1 At the violation hearing, Silvestri “described his flagrant disregard of probation rules, 
including [his] failure to submit to drug testing, his admitted illegal drug use, failure to 
follow safety protocol, his involvement in the citizen extremist movement [and] 
antigovernment activities, all of which made him unsupervisable by [the probation] 
department.”  Commonwealth. v. Lyszkowski, No. 1681 EDA 2013, 2014 WL 10965195, 
at *2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Sentence,” which Judge Gibbons denied on May 29, 2013.  Lyszkowksi then filed a 
notice of appeal to the Superior Court on June 6, 2013, and the Superior Court affirmed 
the judgment of sentence on April 25, 2014, finding that “[t]he lower court was free to 
believe the evidence proffered by the probation officer that Lyszkowski violated his 
probation and was free to reject Lyszkowski’s bald assertion that this evidence was 
false.”  Lyszkowski, 2014 WL 10965195, at *5.  
Lyszkowksi now claims in this action that Silvestri improperly engaged in an ex 
parte meeting with Judge Gibbons prior to the hearing, with the purpose to “inflame 
Gibbons to incarcerate [Lyszkowksi] for the maximum term,” and that Judge Gibbons 
“arbitrarily” denied his motion to strike.  He claims that Gibbons and Bramblett 
intentionally prevented appellate review of his sentence by improperly docketing his 
notice of appeal.   
On February 2, 2016, the District Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss 
Lyszkowksi’s Amended Complaint, without prejudice, finding that Judge Gibbons was 
entitled to judicial immunity, and that Silvestri and Bramblett were entitled to quasi-
judicial immunity.  After Lyszkowksi filed a substantially similar Second Amended 
Complaint, the Court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss, with prejudice, finding 
that, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), he “still did not plead facts 
overcoming the immunity afforded to public servants.”  Following the Court’s denial of 
his motion filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), this timely appeal ensued. 
II. 
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We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 
dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo and ask whether it has “sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on [its] face.”  
Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).  “We review motions to alter or amend a judgment filed pursuant 
to Rule 59(e) . . . for abuse of discretion, except over matters of law, which are subject to 
plenary review.”   Addie v. Kjaer, 737 F.3d 854, 867 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  And we “may affirm a result reached by the district court on different 
reasons, as long as the record supports the judgment.”  Guthrie v. Lady Jane Collieries, 
Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1145 n.1 (3d Cir. 1983). 
We will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Lyszkowksi’s claims against 
Judge Gibbons on the basis of judicial immunity but will affirm the dismissal of his 
remaining claims on other grounds.  Judges are entitled to absolute immunity in § 1983 
actions seeking monetary damages for actions performed in their judicial capacities 
unless (1) the challenged action is “not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity,” or (2) the 
action is “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.”  Gallas v. Sup. Ct. of Pa., 
211 F.3d 760, 768 (3d Cir. 2000).  Lyszkowksi claims that Judge Gibbons arbitrarily 
denied his motion to strike, improperly revoked his probation, and failed to correct an 
alleged docketing error related to his notice of appeal.  Because these actions, or 
inactions, were taken in her judicial capacity, and not “in the clear absence of all 
jurisdiction,” the District Court properly granted her immunity.  Gallas, 211 F.3d at 769 
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(3d Cir. 2000) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took 
was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be 
subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).2  
Lyszkowksi’s claim against Bramblett fails for a more fundamental reason – he 
fails to allege any constitutionally cognizable injury arising from her conduct.  To recover 
under § 1983, “(1) the conduct complained of must have been done by some person 
acting under color of law; and (2) such conduct must have subjected the complainant to 
the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured to him by the Constitution and 
laws of the United States.”  Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1965).  And a 
complaint is properly dismissed where, as here, “no tenable theory of federal wrong is 
apparent.”  Rodes v. Mun. Auth. of Borough of Milford, 409 F.2d 16, 17 (3d Cir. 1969).    
Lyszkowksi claims that Bramblett’s docketing error thwarted his appeal to 
Superior Court.  But even if she committed such an error, Lyszkowksi did not suffer the 
type of harm necessary to state a viable claim under § 1983 because the Superior Court 
addressed his appeal on its merits, without limitation.3 
                                              
2 A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on the basis of absolute immunity is appropriate so long as 
“the allegations of [the] complaint . . . indicate the existence of absolute immunity as an 
affirmative defense,” and “the defense . . . clearly appear[s] on the face of the complaint.” 
Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1989).  Both conditions are met here. 
3 Lyszkowksi claims that Bramblett improperly docketed his June 6, 2013, notice of 
appeal as an appeal from the May 1, 2013, judgment of sentence – rather than from the 
court’s May 29, 2013, order denying his motion to modify – rendering his appeal 
untimely, and that neither Bramblett nor Gibbons corrected this error.  But a defendant 
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Finally, Lyszkowksi claims that Silvestri improperly “inflame[d] Gibbons to 
incarcerate [him] for the maximum term.”  This claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 
512 U.S. 477 (1994), because it essentially seeks to challenge the length of his sentence – 
whether imposition of the maximum term was improper.  In Heck, “the Supreme Court 
held that where success in a § 1983 action would implicitly call into question the validity 
of conviction or duration of sentence, the plaintiff must first achieve favorable 
termination of his available state or federal habeas remedies to challenge the underlying 
conviction or sentence.”  Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 
Heck).  Heck applies to claims against probation officer related to probation revocation 
decisions.  Crow v. Penry, 102 F.3d 1086, 1087 (10th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). 
Here, Lyszkowksi seeks relief4 under § 1983, arguing that the sentencing court 
improperly imposed the maximum term of confinement, but he has not successfully 
                                                                                                                                                  
seeking to appeal a probation revocation order must do so within 30 days of that order, 
and the court’s denial of a motion to modify sentence does not extend the 30-day appeal 
period.  See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 721 A.2d 798, 799 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (per 
curiam).  Thus Lyszkowksi’s notice of appeal – filed more than 30 days after the 
revocation order – was untimely, no matter how it was docketed.  At any rate, the alleged 
docketing error had no impact on his appeal because the Superior Court “g[a]ve 
Lyszkowski the benefit of the doubt and exercise[d] jurisdiction over his appeal.”  
Lyszkowski, 2014 WL 10965195, at *2.  Thus, at most, Bramblett’s alleged docketing 
error may have caused Lyszkowksi to experience some anxiety or uncertainty about the 
status of his appeal.  But “[t]rivial or frivolous invasions of personal rights are not 
cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”  Brown v. Bigger, 622 F.2d 1025, 1027 (10th Cir. 
1980) (per curiam). 
 
 
4 He seeks both damages and an unspecified declaratory judgment.  But “a state 
prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred (absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought 
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challenged that sentence in any state or federal proceeding.5  And because a favorable 
decision in this action would necessarily call into question the duration of that sentence, 
this action is not cognizable under Heck.  See Williams, 453 F.3d at 177.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the orders of the District Court granting Defendants’ motions to dismiss 
and denying Lyszkowksi’s motion filed under Rule 59(e).  However, because it appears 
that the District Court improperly applied the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity to 
dismiss the claims against Silvestri with prejudice,6 we will modify the order of dismissal 
to reflect that these claims are dismissed without prejudice.  See Curry v. Yachera, 835 
F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that a dismissal under Heck is without prejudice to 
a claim’s reassertion following a favorable termination). 
                                                                                                                                                  
(damages or equitable relief) . . . if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate 
the invalidity of confinement or its duration.”  Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 
(2005). 
5 The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and Lyszkowksi has not initiated 
any federal proceeding challenging his sentence. 
6 When probation officers act in an executive capacity, i.e., “charg[ing] [a defendant] 
with wrongdoing and present[ing] evidence to that effect,” they “are not entitled to 
absolute [quasi-judicial] immunity from suit, but only to a qualified, good-faith 
immunity.”  Harper v. Jeffries, 808 F.2d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 1986).  Because the allegation 
against Silvestri relates to her presentation of evidence against Lyszkowski, she was 
likely acting in an executive capacity and not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.  Thus it 
appears that the District Court erred by dismissing Lyszkowksi’s claims on that basis 
before considering whether Silvestri’s conduct met the standard for qualified immunity.  
Harper, 808 F.2d at 284. 
 
